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PACIFIC BLOCKADE:
A LOST OPPORTUNITY OF THE 1930'S?
Walter R. Thomas
It seems to be unfortunately
true that the epidemic of world
lawlessness is spreading. When an
epidemic of physical disease starts
to spread, the community approves and joins in a quarantine in
order to protect the health of the
community against the spread of
the disease. 1
Although President Franklin D.
Roosevelt's quarantine address, which
was delivered in Chicago on 5 October
1937, failed to outline any detailed
national or international program which
would deter potential aggressors, this
particular speech was at least a frank
and open invitation to military and
political leaders at home and abroad to
reappraise the tenets of isolationism and
appeasement which had become imbedded in the basic structure of their
nations' foreign policies. Perhaps the
President was not individually ready to
initiate or direct an international program of collective action but, by 1937,
he was becoming obviously uncomfortable "rithin the confines of the
Neutrality Acts where, to some extent,
he had placed himself and the country.
Japan's earlier refusal to abide by her
naval limitations and the gradual collapse of the League of Nations, together
with the years of creeping conflicts up
to 1937, had a profound and discouraging effect upon that KelloggBriand world which had been assured,

with engaging naivety, that war was
outlawed. It was also becoming apparent that the United States could not
really snuggle under a blanket of isolation and tuck out the international
community. The President, therefore,
was leaning toward closer ties with
peaceful nations-but the American
public was not ready.
Isolationists, pacifists, protectionists,
and internationalists of every hue examined the body of the President's
speech and found, according to their
bent, some reason to reject it. Spectres
of embargoes, sanctions, boycotts, foreign entanglements, neutrality violations, and the abandonment of the
Monroe Doctrine stalked across the
pages of America's newspapers and
periodicals. These critics continued to
haunt the President until, with discouraging finality, the abortive Brussels'
Conference of late 1937 disclosed that
unity of effort was an unstable commodity in both the domestic and the
international market.
This germ of isolation, which had
infected the country since World War I,
had not altogether spared the officers of
the United States Navy, even as late as
1937. One wrote:
The New World with the support of the United States is
completely self-sufficient and impregnable to almost any type of
attack. The United States and the
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New World remain intact in the
face of potential world destruction. 2
Collective Blockades. Although many
courses of positive action could have
been effected under the President's
"quarantine" banner, there is an obvious facet of naval involvement which is
particularly noticeable by its absence.
The concept of collective pacific blockades, which had been formerly employed with some success, was not
considered as a possible ocean strategy
against aggressors between 1935 and
1939. Was this because of international
reluctance, military inability, illegality
(under international law), or a genuine
failure to review the operational practicality of suppressing aggression
through limited confrontation on the
high seas?
As a precedent for action there had
been about 20 collective pacific blockade cases effectively recorded before
World War II. In 1827 Russia, France,
and Great Britain, acting in concert,
blockaded the Morea to prevent the
Turkish fleet from coming out of Navarino during one of the many TurkishGreek disputes. Again, in 1833, the
French and British forces blockaded the
Netherlands until the Dutch carried out
an 1831 treaty which provided for the
independence of Belgium.
From 1845-1850 the French and the
British blockaded Uruguay to cut off
Argentine supplies to the Oribe forces;
and in 1897 Britain, France, Austria,
Germany, Italy, and Russia blockaded
Crete to prevent other nations from
delivering weapons to Greek insurgents.
These collective blockades were both
pacific and effective and demonstrated
how combined naval action could create
stability within an area. 3
The League of Nations also could
have directed a collective pacific blockade based on its covenant and the
principle that "any state or states may
blockade the coasts and ports of an-

other state in time of peace to coerce
the latter into acting in accordance with
the wishes of the blockading state or
states. '>4
Great Britain and the United States,
for example, had recently acquiesced to
this legal gambit when Japan set up a
"pacific blockade on 25 August 1937 of
the territory between the mouth of the
Yangtze and Swatow for all Chinese
vessels and nonpeaceful cargo of third
states. "5
By the spring of 1938, then, the
in ternational legality of collective
pacific blockades was generally unquestioned; the naval forces of the
nonaggressor members of the League of
Nations, together with the United States
Navy, was superior to the collective
navies of Japan, Germany and Italy; the
violation of the Versailles Treaty and
the Kellogg-Briand Pact provided
sufficient aggravation for all other signatories to demand a cessation of
hostile acts; and the world seemed
ready, if not really eager, to listen to
advocates of containment. It is therefore surprising that naval officers and
seapower savants-including President
Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill-did not at
least gravitate toward the advantages of
using their combined naval forces as a
threat against the greedy nations, particularly since the success of collective
pacific blockades had been well documented.
Enforcement and Theory. Admittedly the use of blockade as a
weapon is hazardous for it can be as
easily pointed in error toward the
saintly as in honor toward the sinful.
There are, nevertheless, certain singular
advantages in using pacific blockades:
1. Pressure can be applied on actual
or potential aggressors away from territorial boundaries by warships of the
blockading states.
2. Economic restrictions are effected
without directly involving the native
populace in conflict.
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3. Military units can be maintained
in nonsovereign waters.
4. International decisions may gravitate toward areas less combatant in
nature than war.
5. The alternate avenues of arbitration, mediation, and conciliation can be
thoroughly explored before war becomes inevitable.
The theory of pacific blockade also
has exceptional attraction. It is usually
bloodless, which appeals to the humane;
it is done with a minimum of military
force, which entices economists and
politicians; and it is imposed on the sea,
away from the territory of the offending state, which results in an irresistible
charm for statesmen and naval advocates. Admiral Powers has written:
Although it has been stated
that unilateral pacific blockade is
no longer permissible for an individual member of the United
Nations, the possibility of one
should not be dismissed. A uniI a teral declaration of pacific
blockade which was stated to be
in the interest of world peace,
which was justified by the action
of the nation blockaded, and
which was accepted by the world,
should be upheld. 6
By 1937, a similar posture of enforcement which did not directly
threaten the political structure of another nation nor intrude upon its sovereignty with armed forces may have been
the only rational answer to overt aggressors.
No attempt has been made to charge,
in retrospect, that American leaders or
naval officers were delinquent in not
publicly proposing that collective pacific blockades were a panacea for early
Axis aggressions. Neither is there a
directed verdict that collective pacific
blockades could have been successfully
effected or that their initiation would
have thwarted or delayed the ambitious
designs of Italy, Germany, or Japan. It
is merely that the lack of naval

affiliation with quarantine bears scrutiny, not only because of the natural
affinity benY'een naval power and foreign relations, but because writers, both
then and now, have neglected to advocate the possibility of using seapower
and collective pacific blockades as an
obstacle to expansionist movements.
Navy Posture in the 1930's. The
primary interests of the United States
Navy in the 1930's were in the funding
of a badly needed shipbuilding and
research program and in the tactical
training and operational readiness of its
officers and men against possible future
adversaries.
If the United States Navy had been
modernized and brought to the parity
limits allowed by the Washington and
London Conferences, perhaps her sea
supremacy over all other nations, except
Great Britain, would have encouraged
adventures in power ploys abroad. At
least, such leadership would have issued
a temptation to use this force in international discussions by" 1937-despite the
isolationist sentiment that might have
refused to sanction its actual application. Unfortunately, the American Fleet
was approximately 65 percent of treaty
strength at this time, while the Japanese
Fleet approached 95 percent; and, even
when marines were being sent to Shanghai in August 1937, the Asiatic Fleet
was only a modest force. It was not
until after Great Britain entered World
War 'n that President Roosevelt asked
Congress to expand the Navy beyond
the old treaty limits or to beef up the
island outposts in the Pacific.
The pretense of naval superiority
through ceiling limitations had, in
reality, severely handicapped the United
States. The Navy had neither the ships
nor men to enforce a unilateral pacific
blockade against Italy in" 1935, and it
was even less capable of effecting such
action against Japan by 1937.
There were, however, adequate
grounds for proposing that the Presi-
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dent's quarantine might he translated
into the fonuidahle posture of collective
pacific hlockades. While such a plan
would have heen more effective if it had
heen. initiated against Italy in 1935,
continued against Genuany in 1936,
and used in its third phase against Japan
in 1937, there was still an opportunity
for a forthright comhined naval program
in early 1938 if future European allies
had joined the United States in a relatively moderate confrontation of the
three major aggressors hefore Munich.
It is easy. to discard moderate seapower proposals as futile hecause they
could not have altered the inevitahle
course of hiStory. By 1937, for example, the Nine Power Treaty had
crumhled, initial aggression had heen
tolerated, and the U.S. Neutrality Acts
were a stern reality; hut the leaders of
many nations seem to have· heen
awakening to the need for action, even
if they were divided or completely
unaware of how their efforts could he
directed.
The imposition of collective pacific
hlockades, therefore, still might have
heen a valuahle strategy as a response to
the President's quarantine quandary. It
would have required delicate diplomacy,
a strong legal position within the restraints of international law, coordinated naval tactics, and exceptional
leadership hy the heads of nations who
contrihuted unit support. Perhaps these
elements could have led puhlic opinion
into the peace offensive toward which

President Roosevelt dedicated his later
efforts.
An examination of comhined allied
naval strengths and the suitahility of
collective naval hlockades indicates that
the fonuulation of a combined seapower posture would have heen one
practical application of quarantine
under international law-though certainly not the only possihle hulwark to
the cupidity of the Axis leaders from
1935 to 1939.
However, after Great Britain determined to recognize Italy's conquest of
Ethiopia and Hitler occupied Austria,
there was no longer a major detour
around Munich. No leaders sincerely
desired to ratify aggression, hut neither
did they wish to emhrace conflict.
Collective action, while contemplated,
never hecame a matter of active military
involvement. .Pacific hlockades, while
logical, were not equated with quarantine hy naval or civilian scholars. The
fleeting opportunity to test quarantine
as a deterrent to aggression passed
over the heads of seapower advocates
from Octoher 1937 until Octoher
1962.
Since estahlishment of the United
Nations, claims coercively to hlockade
are to he measured against the requirements of self-defense, enforcement
action hy regional arrangements, or
police action hy the organized community. The position of quarantine,
however, as a collective pacific hlockade, still remains nehulous.
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